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Special SeriesFrom the rise of a new private sector–and the billionaires that sustain and exploit it–to the beginning of a vast national identity database, articles in this series examine the messy and maddening road to progress in India.About India InkThis report on India from the journalists of The New York Times and a pool of talented writers in India and beyond provides unbiased, authoritative reporting on the country and its place in the world. India Ink also strives to be a virtual meeting point for discussion of this complex, fast-changing democracy – its politics, economy, culture and everyday life.Archive Select Month May 2012 April 2012 March 2012 February 2012 January 2012 December 2011 November 2011 October 2011 September 2011Recent PostsMay 22 One quarter of South ... Continue reading →
Samuel Beckett, born in a suburb of Dublin in 1906, was a native English speaker. However, in 1946 Beckett decided that he would begin writing exclusively in French. After composing the first draft in his second language, he would then translate these words back into English. This difficult constraint – forcing himself to consciously unpack his own sentences – led to a burst of genius, as many of Beckett’s most famous works (Malloy, Malone Dies, Waiting for Godot, etc.) were written during this period. When asked why he wrote first in French, Beckett said it made it easier for him to “write without style.” Beckett would later expand on these comments, noting that his use of French prevented him from slipping into his usual writerly ... Continue reading →
He cut out the generals. He cut out the secretary of defense. He cut out the secretary of state. And in the end, he produced a schizophrenic policy that will almost certainly go down as the greatest foreign-policy debacle of his administration. Afghanistan may not be Barack Obama's Vietnam, but that is only because it has failed to stir national tensions in the way the war in Southeast Asia did. He may therefore get away with his errors in judgment and his victimization by circumstance to a degree that Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon could not. But it is impossible to read accounts like David Sanger's in the New York Times this weekend without concluding that the primary drivers behind U.S. AfPak policy for the ... Continue reading →
