Center for International Maritime Security

By Lieutenant Alana Davis, U.S. Navy Introduction: When Maintenance Goes Wrong, or Doesn’t Go at All In May of 2024 I was working as a Submarine Squadron Staff Officer when news of a submarine sailor’s death spread to our office. Sonar Technician 3rd Class Timothe Sanders was found dead onboard the in-port USS Helena after inadvertently touching an energized 440 Volt electrical panel improperly returned to service following a tagout for maintenance.

By Major Joseph Potter, U.S. Army Taiwan’s ability to independently support itself is integral to its survival but also clearly aligns with America’s national interests. Arming Taiwan is an America First policy; the reinvigoration of American global power is enhanced by enabling Taiwan to defend itself. It is an explicit “end” mandated by the National Security Strategy and a key “way” identified in the Defense Strategy. The United States has maintained relations with Taiwan since 1949.

By Dr. Marcus Jones For the first time in decades, the United States is being forced to think seriously about naval shipbuilding as an allied industrial problem. Years of delayed programs, strained yards, maintenance backlogs, workforce losses and shortages, and the near-disappearance of commercial shipbuilding have converged with China’s extraordinary maritime-industrial expansion; old assumptions about U.S. defense-industrial sufficiency are untenable.

By Admiral Massimo Vianello, Italian Navy (Ret.) and Master Chief Petty Officer Giovanni Giorguli, Italian Navy (Ret.) Introduction Throughout naval history, few weapons have demonstrated the strategic endurance of the naval mine.

By Meng Kit Tang A Myth Before the Launch In June 2026, the chairman of Taiwan’s China Shipbuilding Corporation’s (CSBC), announced that  the Hai Kun submarine was “on track” for delivery in 2026, but something else he said was even more telling. He added that pressure from the People’s Republic of China “has always existed,” on the program and that even after contracts are signed and parts are built, a shipment of parts can still be stopped at the last minute for political reasons.

By Hervé Auffret Ships can deter a competitor, compel a rival, and escort a convoy. What they cannot do is build the institutions, relationships, information systems, and rules that keep maritime order running when the guns are silent. China has worked this out. Washington and most of its partners treat governance as an appendage to naval strategy, rather than a domain of competition in its own right.

Stories Due: November 10, 2026 Week Dates: December 7-11, 2026 Story Length: 1,500-3,000 Words Submit to: Content@cimsec.org By Brian Kerg In annual tradition, CIMSEC will be featuring a series of short stories that explore the nature of conflict and competition through fiction. Fiction has long served as a powerful means for exploring hypotheticals and envisioning alternatives. Authors are challenged to explore how potential clashes and warfighting challenges may play out.

by Tatum Delaney The countdown ticks forward, each second marching the Arctic ice closer to its liquid form. Some see opportunity in what will be left behind: new sea lanes, access to resources, and expanded commercial activity. Others see danger in a region where governance structures and territorial claims are outpaced by national ambitions. Is the United States prepared for the risks of a rapidly changing Arctic? Author Kenneth R.

By James J. Wirtz No one disagrees that the Navy has not had much luck constructing warships this century. It also continues to face significant challenges when building the next small surface combatant, the Future Frigate (FFX). It is becoming increasingly difficult to pack meaningful warfighting capability into a ship that is smaller and cheaper to build and operate than today’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

By Adam Lockyer Between June 24 to July 31, Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2026 took place on and around the Hawaiian Islands. RIMPAC is the world’s largest international exercise. In this, its 30th iteration, RIMPAC boasted 25,000 personnel, 40 surface ships, 5 submarines, and 140 aircraft. Beyond the impressive headlines, however, RIMPAC has become a relic of the Cold War and needs revitalization and reorientation.