Center for International Maritime Security

By Frank Bell Introduction Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb occupy positions of strategic importance disproportionate to their size. Situated near the Strait of Hormuz, the three islands provide forward positions for surveillance, missiles, unmanned systems, and maritime interdiction.

By Christopher Rice Space-based technology empowers American leadership—economic, cultural, and military. Further, as Part I of this essay noted, the nation’s rivals have made significant investments towards targeting the vulnerabilities of her space sectors, both in orbit and online. Part II will outline current space cybersecurity policy at the national level and identify some of its risks.

By Christopher Rice As the 2025 National Security Strategy notes, commercial and military space capabilities are one of the United States’ greatest geopolitical advantages.1  The nation’s civil, commercial, and military sectors have profited immensely from unrivaled incorporation of space-based capabilities. However, competitors have identified weaknesses and shaped their strategic approaches to exploit them.

By LT Connor Keating, U.S. Navy During World War II, General Quarters (GQ) was essential to U.S. Navy ship survivability. Setting GQ established the highest material condition—Zebra—throughout the ship and manned every combat and repair station with the crew’s most qualified personnel. That model reflected an era in which major naval engagements were expected to be intense but comparatively short.

By Adam Reiffen Working afloat and ashore, the U.S. Navy’s Information Warfare Officers engage adversaries, create plans, connect circuits, and drive operations around the world every day. In May 2026, the Information Warfare Community was directed by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to reorganize itself within the Pentagon, a large-scale change to the manning, funding, and authorities required for global operations.

By Lieutenant Colonel Pete Combe, USMC The goal of this article is to articulate one past commander’s approach to discipline, with a focus on improving operational readiness. The author does not mean to imply that other O5 and O6 commanders pursue discipline for solely punitive reasons.

By Catherine Marie Abbott A version of this article was originally published by the Center for Maritime Strategy, a non-profit, non-partisan think tank and research institution dedicated to studying maritime issues and their context within wider American national security policy. This article is republished with permission.

By Bruce Stubbs I. Introduction The United States should designate the U.S. Coast Guard as its lead agency for maritime security in the Western Hemisphere. In military command and control terminology, this would make the Coast Guard the “supported” service with all other armed services and federal agencies as “supporting” services. Such a designation would reverse the customary approach for the Navy to lead at sea, but this reversal is long overdue.

By Joseph Hanacek and Josh Richards Building the Airborne Asymmetry In the predawn hours of June 1, 2025, a revolution in warfighting unfolded across Russia’s western airfields. Nearly 3,000 miles from the Ukrainian frontlines, Kyiv launched Operation Spiderweb, a coordinated strike of hundreds of weaponized drones aimed at five Russian air bases.1 The machines were rudimentary: off-the-shelf frames, improvised explosives, and batteries scavenged from consumer supply chains.

By Meng Kit Tang Markets Close Before Missiles Fire Tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf fell from 138 transits to fewer than eight within days of insurers withdrawing war-risk coverage in 2026. No ships were seized nor missiles were fired. Rather, the market closed the water before any navy could. That episode clarifies the problem in the Taiwan Strait more starkly than any fleet comparison. A quarantine there need not begin with interdiction.