Icds

By early 2026, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine had entered its fifth year with no end in sight and an assessed reconstruction and recovery cost approaching EUR 507 billion over ten years, according to the Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment published in February 2026. This paper maps Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery needs across a spectrum from active conflict to long-term managed insecurity. Three findings run through the analysis.

France’s response to the Israeli–Lebanese crisis underscores both the enduring nature of its historical ties with Lebanon and the decline of its regional influence. Despite its consistent diplomatic support for Lebanese sovereignty, Paris seems unable to play a significant role in shaping the ceasefire negotiations and post-conflict arrangements, while the dominance of US-led diplomacy continues to grow.

A report by the European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC) Edited by: Bernhard Bartsch, Claudia Wessling Peer reviews by: Andreas B. Forsby, Nick Nieschalke, John Seaman, Tamás Matura, Francesca Maremonti, Aurelio Insisa, Matej Šimalčík, Filip Šebok, Anastas Vangeli, Katja Zajc Kejžar, Mario Esteban, Miriam Tardell China’s drive to become a global leader in science, technology and innovation has huge implications for the EU and its member states.

A Russian Orthodox priest blesses a Su-27SM fighter jet on the airfield of Belbek military airport outside Sevastopol in November 2014, as occupied Crimea’s military air forces were reinforced by ten Russian Su-27SM and four Su-30 fighter jets. Photo: AFP/Scanpix In 2022, concerns about escalation contributed to significant western restraint. By 2024, that caution had diminished. Western states approved increasingly advanced weapons systems and relaxed restrictions on their use.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev welcomes Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during their meeting in Gabala, northern Azerbaijan, in April 2026. Photo: Reuters/Press Service of President of Azerbaijan/Scanpix The growing influence of external actors in the post-Soviet space is yet another trend that highlights Russia’s decline. Moscow is losing its dominance and becoming just one of many players.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Sino-Russian relations have expanded significantly. Russia has reoriented much of its trade from Europe to China, conducting it now in rubles and yuan rather than dollars. Equipment and components supplied by China have played a vitally important role in helping Russia’s defence industry mitigate the effects of western sanctions. There are several other examples of enhanced cooperation. Defence ties have grown.

Aside from Napoleon's own military acumen, the French emperor came to dominate Europe largely because successive European coalitions failed to translate their superior combined power into effective action. Competing interests, divergent strategic priorities and poor coordination prevented Europeans from confronting the common enemy together. The collapse of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) offers a reminder that this challenge has not entirely disappeared from the continent.

A demonstration in London in June 2025. Photo: ZUMA Press/Scanpix Around half of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from occupied territories remain in regular contact with family and friends still living under occupation.[13] This is an existing, durable channel running in both directions across the frontline. The policy question is not how to engineer new channels but how to reduce the risks of what is already occurring.

A military vehicle drives along a road covered with anti-drone net with an entangled Russian drone in the frontline town of Druzhkivka in Donetsk region in April 2026. Reuters/Scanpix Russia’s war in Ukraine is forging a new doctrinal framework in real time. Persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance coverage through unmanned systems is redefining concealment and manoeuvre.

On 15 May 2026 in Chișinău, Moldova, 34 member states of the Council of Europe, plus Australia, Costa Rica, and the EU (as an institutional body), adopted the resolution establishing the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Steering Committee of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.