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If it is true that art imitates life, works of imagination can reflect underlying truths about our own experience. The English artist David Hockney, who died last month, certainly understood that. In reflecting on his brilliant and endlessly joyful work, even the most dismal-minded economist might learn something about how to interpret reality. Hockney saw that art comes not just from the mind but, more precisely, from memory.

Since his election victory, the new Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar has repeatedly been asked the same question at international press conferences: what advice would he give his French, German or Austrian counterparts on dealing with the rise of the Rassemblement National, the AfD or the FPÖ? It is a fair question — for anyone who sees Viktor Orbán’s defeat as signalling the end of the ‘Illiberal International’ is mistaken. Magyar’s answer is strikingly straightforward.

Europe has spent decades confronting the legacies of colonialism, slavery and racial hierarchy. This reckoning has been necessary and remains incomplete. Yet Russia’s war against Ukraine has exposed a major blind spot in Europe’s post-imperial imagination: the continent has learned to recognise some empires far more readily than others. Russian domination of Ukraine is often described as aggression, revisionism or a security threat. It is all of these. But it is also imperial.

On the heels of America’s 250th anniversary, I felt the curious need to resist my usual penchant for economic and geopolitical analyses of claims made for or against the United States. Instead, I surrendered to an emotional, personal, indeed an Athenian, take on the global hegemon whose development and actions have shaped us all. My earliest memory of America as a factor in my life harks back to a hot afternoon in early June 1968.

In 2020, Elon Musk posted a tweet asking people to ‘Take the red pill.’ Two years later, he bought Twitter, the platform now known as X. What followed was one of the most dramatic restructurings in the platform’s history.

The EU and its member states have long held a clear and undisputed position: Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are illegal under international law and stand in the way of a two-state solution. Nevertheless, this position has so far not been translated into a consistent policy. Through its differentiation policy – distinguishing between relations with Israel and with the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories – the EU already clarified its legal position in 2005.

Of the many minilateral formats in Europe, the Visegrád Group (V4) has grown to be the most visible – and the most infamous – largely due to the European ambitions of the project and its political leaders. After a four-year hiatus in political-level cooperation, the group seems to be gaining a new lease of life. Once again, a Hungarian prime minister is at the forefront, attempting to lead the grouping.

According to a recent study by 150 political scientists, nearly one in five Europeans now votes for the far right. This share has increased dramatically over the past three decades. In France, Austria and the United Kingdom, far-right parties are closer than ever to political power. Other countries long assumed to be immune, such as Germany and Spain, have recently witnessed the rise of successful radical-right movements.

In his first government policy statement, Chancellor Friedrich Merz emphasised: ‘We need to work more again in this country, and above all more efficiently. We will not be able to preserve this country’s prosperity with a four-day week and work-life balance.’ Leading CDU/CSU politicians are also calling for cuts to the welfare state, ranging from reductions in the citizen’s benefit (Bürgergeld) and tougher sanctions to a longer working life.

The supposed right of the stronger has become a weakness. Great military powers such as the United States, Russia and Israel have increasingly relied on military force in recent years as a means of advancing their interests. In their capitals, the conviction prevailed that international law was useless or even an annoying obstacle.