Middle East Forum

Iran proposes collecting tolls or fees from ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz to generate up to $40 billion annually. According to discussions among Iran, Oman, and other regional players, Tehran has suggested charging for “security, safety, and environmental services.” The Iranian reading of other chokepoint fee schemes, however, is faulty.

Iran’s evolving approach to state capture in Iraq shows how the old line between state institutions and non‑state proxies has largely dissolved. Instead of relying solely on militias and their political fronts, Tehran has used the post‑2003 ethno‑sectarian power‑sharing system to place loyalists deep inside Iraq’s governing structures. In doing so, it has steadily reshaped state bodies into tools for advancing its regional and global agenda.

While analysts and policymakers remain focused on the Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon crescent, a parallel westward corridor now emerges into Egypt and perhaps into oil-rich Libya. Unlike the Iranian axis network, usually composed of ideological non-state actors, the new network’s primary mechanism relies on a transactional geopolitical architecture.

The June 14, 2026, agreement between Washington and Tehran has rendered one conclusion inescapable: Israel no longer can anchor its security to a patron whose priorities shift with every U.S. administration. Reopening the Strait of Hormuz, restoring financial flows to the regime, and launching new nuclear talks have bolstered Iran’s confidence and given renewed resources that revive Iranian networks across the West.

On May 13, 2026, Israeli State Comptroller Matanyahu Engelman issued a report that found Israel entered the current war with weakened domestic weapons-production capabilities, stockpile deficiencies, and growing dependence on foreign suppliers for critical raw materials and munitions. The findings have already prompted a response: Israel established a National Armament Council and launched an effort to rebuild defense production after what officials describe as a lost decade.

For years, Donald Trump and his supporters often said that Iran never wins wars, but never loses negotiations either. This critique was often made about U.S. administrations, particularly the Obama administration and the 2015 nuclear deal, which Trump called one of the worst agreements in American history. However, under Trump’s leadership, recent events suggest a different, even ironic, outcome. It seems Trump has lost both the military confrontation with Iran and the negotiations that followed.

As a companion to my previous interview with an analyst based in Israel regarding the recent U.S. and Israeli war against Iran and the subsequent ‘memorandum of understanding’ (MoU) between the U.S. and Iran, I present this interview with a contact who resides in the Iranian city of Qom (known as a centre of religious learning). He has resided in Iran since 2012, having originally come there from Syria, and I have known him for many years.

As the US House Armed Services Committee debates whether to pass Section 224 of the fiscal year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act, a provision that would formally bind American and Israeli defense technology sectors through joint research, co-production, and shared industrial infrastructure, Israel has quietly moved past the argument entirely. While Reps.

For two decades, every power that wanted a military foothold in the Horn of Africa went to Djibouti. The United States leased Camp Lemonnier, France stationed 1,500 troops in Djibouti, and Japan established its only overseas base there, soon joined by Italy. Then China arrived.

As the 60-day period of negotiations stipulated by the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed between Iran and the US gets under way in Switzerland, the issue of Lebanon is fast emerging as a central bone of contention between them. It is also revealing significant differences in the stances of America and Israel.