Futura Doctrina

Over the weekend of 12 July, three American sea drones crept toward a pier at Iran’s Bandar Abbas naval base and blew up a Ghadir class midget submarine sitting in a maintenance cradle. It was the first time the United States had used an armed uncrewed surface vessel in combat. The vessels involved were Saronic Corsairs, a 24 foot, 35 knot one way attack boat with a 1,000-pound warhead and a thousand nautical mile range, built by a company that did not exist five years ago.

Trump: "Would you go to Moscow (to meet Putin)?" Zelenskyy: "It's difficult. There are a lot of Ukrainian drones there. It's dangerous." From Trump-Zelenskyy meeting this week. As I write this, the fragile memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran has collapsed and the US is undertaking another round of strikes against Iranian targets. Iran has said it is closing the Strait of Hormuz.

Recently, my report on the systemic learning disorder in western military organisations, their inability to learn and adapt quickly from other people’s wars, was published by the Lowy Institute. Long time readers of Futura Doctrina will recognise the theme.

I honour beyond measure those who do their full duty…and all the more because the doing of duty generally means pain, hardship, self-mastery, learning effort, steady perseverance under difficulty and discouragement. Theodore Roosevelt, 1903. I thought I would include the above quote today because, while written by an American on the other side of the Atlantic, it very much applies to those serving in the defence of Ukraine in so many different ways.

This year, I invited a group of experts who examine topics such as military strategy, drone warfare, the war in Ukraine, military transformation, and the security situation in the Pacific to write guest articles for publication here at Futura Doctrina. The first piece, written by Dr Frank Hoffman, covered the important topic of AI and critical thinking. It was published in February, and can be read here.

On 14 June, President Donald Trump announced that the United States and Iran had reached a preliminary agreement to halt the fighting that has consumed the Gulf since the American and Israeli assault on Iran in late February. The deal, confirmed by Tehran and detailed to reporters mid-week, extends a fragile ceasefire for sixty days, lifts the United States naval blockade and reopens the Strait of Hormuz, while leaving the fate of Iran’s nuclear programme to a difficult second phase of talks.

Image: Ukraine Ministry of Defence In Clausewitzian terms, war is a contest, a complex, interactive duel between two opponents. It is a phenomenon of indeterminant length, which presents the opportunity for the contestants to adapt to their enemy’s strategy, operations and tactical approach. Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War.

A soon-to-be former Russian fuel train. Image: @414magyarbirds We continue to apply Ukrainian long-range sanctions against Russian military facilities and the oil industry.President Zelenskyy, 10 June 2026. This was a week in which wars and the diplomacy that surrounds them moved together.

The political struggle within each country affects everything that matters in ending a war. It intrudes into the formulation of the war aims, it colours and even distorts military estimates, and it inhibits negotiation with the enemy. The views people hold on these matters are interdependent. Those who want their country to pursue ambitious war aims will seek out the favourable military estimates and find reason why negotiations out to be avoided.

Russia hit a dead-end on the battlefield, so it terrorizes Ukraine with deliberate strikes on city centres. These are abhorrent acts of terror meant to kill as many civilians as possible.Kaja Kallas, 24 May 2026. Now that we have entered the fifth year since Putin’s launch of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it is becoming clear that Russia’s war is progressing very poorly. Indeed, 2026 might be the worst year so far for Putin.