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Articles by Bruno Mailly
Surprised by Brains — LessWrong
Skeptic: Oh, come on! There's absolutely no empirical evidence for an assertion like that! Animal brains have been around for hundreds of millions of years without doing anything like what you're saying. I see no reason to think that life-as-we-know-it will end, just because these hominid brains have learned to send low-bandwidth signals over their vocal cords. Nothing like what you're saying has happened before in my experience - Believer: That's kind of the point, isn't it?
Anthropomorphic Optimism — LessWrong
The core fallacy of anthropomorphism is expecting something to be predicted by the black box of your brain, when its casual structure is so different from that of a human brain, as to give you no license to expect any such thing.
The Failures of Eld Science — LessWrong
This time there were no robes, no hoods, no masks. Students were expected to become friends, and allies. And everyone knew why you were in the classroom. It would have been pointless to pretend you weren't in the Conspiracy. Their sensei was Jeffreyssai, who might have been the best of his era, in his era. His students were either the most promising learners, or those whom the beisutsukai saw political advantage in molding. Brennan fell into the latter category, and knew it.
Do We Believe Everything We're Told? — LessWrong
Some early experiments on anchoring and adjustment tested whether distracting the subjects—rendering subjects cognitively “busy” by asking them to keep a lookout for “5” in strings of numbers, or some such—would decrease adjustment, and hence increase the influence of anchors. Most of the experiments seemed to bear out the idea that being cognitive busy increased anchoring, and more generally contamination.
What Evidence Filtered Evidence? — LessWrong
I discussed the dilemma of the clever arguer, hired to sell you a box that may or may not contain a diamond. The clever arguer points out to you that the box has a blue stamp, and it is a valid known fact that diamond-containing boxes are more likely than empty boxes to bear a blue stamp. What happens at this point, from a Bayesian perspective? Must you helplessly update your probabilities, as the clever arguer wishes? If you can look at the box yourself, you can add up all the signs yourself.
The Modesty Argument — LessWrong
The Modesty Argument states that when two or more human beings have common knowledge that they disagree about a question of simple fact, they should each adjust their probability estimates in the direction of the others'. (For example, they might adopt the common mean of their probability distributions.
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