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1 Introduction In recent decades, incentive-adjusting approaches such as individual catch quotas have become the preferred way of managing fisheries, rather than incentive-blocking approaches, including effort controls. This is because such instruments may achieve outcomes that are socially efficient. A large number of fisheries are today managed by tradeable quotas (Chu 2009; Bjørndal and Munro 2012). With a given vessel quota, harvesters will have incentives to minimize the cost of harvesting.
1 INTRODUCTION Agricultural policies in many industrialised countries serve multiple goals including to ensure decent living conditions for the farming community. Research on the income disparity between farmers and non-farmers has therefore a long tradition in the agricultural economics literature (e.g., Gardner, 1969, 1992; Hill, 2012, 2018; Hill & Bradley, 2015; Marino et al., 2021; Rocchi et al., 2020).
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