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Articles by Joris Teer
Dismantling China’s Supply-Chain Weapon
After halting rare earth supply almost entirely in April 2025, Beijing again increased exports for most materials during the remainder of 2025 and the first half of 2026. Yet it kept them at much lower-than-normal levels, even after the supposed détente between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping following their October 2025 meeting in Busan, South Korea.
The EU Semiconductor Geopolitical Risk Survey: Outlook for 2026-2031
This policy paper was published as part of the Chips Diplomacy Support Initiative (CHIPDIPLO), an 18-month project designed to contribute to the shaping of a European foreign policy on semiconductors. The project is coordinated by Institut Montaigne with the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS, Bratislava), the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS, Brussels), and the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS, Paris and Brussels), and co-funded by the European Union.
Beijing’s critical raw material weapon - And how to dismantle it
In 2025, China showed how control over critical raw materials can reshape global power. By tightening and calibrating exports, Beijing disrupted supply chains, raised production costs and exposed the dangers of deep dependencies across Europe, the United States and beyond. What began as retaliation against Washington has evolved into a geo-economic weapon used to gather intelligence, reinforce China’s industrial dominance, and coerce and deter those who act against Beijing’s ‘core interests’.
Webinar: Beijing’s critical raw material weapon – and how to dismantle it
China’s sharp curtailment of critical raw material exports in 2025 severely weakened Europe, the US and other countries in their relations with Beijing. These materials are the backbone of their civilian and defence industries: the production of medical equipment, energy grids, weapon systems and other essential items depends on them. China controls 70% or more of global refining or mining for half of the 34 materials that the EU designates as ‘critical’.
Beijing’s critical raw material weapon - And how to dismantle it
In 2025, China showed how control over critical raw materials can reshape global power. By tightening and calibrating exports, Beijing disrupted supply chains, raised production costs and exposed the dangers of deep dependencies across Europe, the United States and beyond. What began as retaliation against Washington has evolved into a geo-economic weapon used to gather intelligence, reinforce China’s industrial dominance, and coerce and deter those who act against Beijing’s ‘core interests’.
Autonomy or Indispensability? Identifying the EU’s Semiconductor Lodestar
The hyper-specialized division of labor underpinning the global semiconductor value chain has produced acute vulnerabilities. China increasingly weaponizes supply chains against Europe, while President Trump threatens Nvidia’s AI chips too. The risk of military conflict in East Asia, for example over Taiwan or on the Korean Peninsula, has structurally increased as well. These developments threaten Europe’s economic and national security.
Tech war 2.0: The dangers of Trump's 'G2' bargaining with an emboldened China
Metadata Reading time: 11 minutes Download Brief Beijing has shifted the focus of the US-China tech war from a contest over advanced US and allied technologies to a struggle over low value-added but vital components for all industries. By sharply reducing critical mineral exports to most countries throughout 2025, China forced Washington to retreat from non-negotiable ‘national security’ controls towards ‘G2’ bargaining.
False sense of security: European complacency on rare earths is the wrong answer to the US-China trade truce
Metadata Reading time: 6 minutes Talk of a US-China ‘trade truce’ has sent a ripple of relief through Brussels and Member State capitals. EU officials hope that Beijing’s pledges to ease export curbs on rare earths and other strategic materials will result in more stable supply. But Beijing’s promises are laden with technical caveats and shrouded in bureaucratic vagueness. A renewed false sense of security could lull Europe into complacency.
Beyond Trump: Xi’s price wars and weaponisation of critical raw materials threaten European prosperity
Critics blame Europe’s ‘summer of humiliation’ on the EU’s timidity in trade negotiations with President Trump. Yet the greater threat to European prosperity is Beijing’s two-front offensive against Europe’s industries. China provides unmatched state support for its industries, and shields them through local content requirements.
When stars align: Leveraging European defence budgets to drive a dual-use tech boom
Europe’s security and economic competitiveness are under growing strain. Danish intelligence estimates indicate that Russia could test NATO’s Article 5 in a few years time (1). Russia spends more than 8% of its GDP on defence, relies on a war economy, and its forces have been battle-hardened in Ukraine. Europe’s woes do not end there. China’s industrial overcapacity and supply chain weaponisation, Trump’s tariff threats, and persistently high energy prices undermine European industries.
European Ministers of Defence - Save Europe, invest in mining!
This opinion piece by Joris Teer was originally published in Dutch in EW on 27 May 2025 under the title ‘Minister Brekelmans: red Europa, investeer in mijnbouw!’. It is reproduced here in English with the permission of EW.
Resilience by design: A new EU Foreign Economic Policy to counter global disorder
The pledge to develop a new foreign economic policy sits at the heart of the European Commission’s Political Guidelines published in July 2024 (1). This ambition has become even more pressing in light of US President Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ trade policy, signalling a disruptive shift in global economic relations. The new Trump administration’s stated aim is to bring back manufacturing jobs, rebuild the US industrial base, and onshore a broad range of critical value chains.
To survive Moscow, Beijing, and Washington’s economic onslaught, Europe must reindustrialise
With Trump’s tariffs, the EU has fallen victim to great power geo-economic ambitions for the third time. Putin’s decision in 2022 to turn off the gas taps dealt a severe blow to Europe’s energy-intensive industries. Still today, Europeans face four-to-five times higher gas prices than Americans. This pain is partially self-inflicted: the closure of nuclear power plants and gas fields throughout the 2010s had made the EU even more dependent on Moscow.
Outrage is not a policy: The EU should engage Trump’s team to boost industrial capacity outside China and Russia
‘We have great raw earth material. We are not allowed to use it because of the environment. I will let them use it’, Trump said two weeks before the election. He mentioned bringing back manufacturing first when asked about US economic needs. Trump is not alone. Influential alumni of his first administration are laser-focused on strengthening the defence industrial base and the defence industrial subbase.
Preventing war in East Asia
A European action plan to strengthen deterrence Over the last half century, East Asia has become the global economy’s manufacturing hub. Powerful trends have made a military conflict in East Asia, especially over Taiwan, more likely since 2016. The most important of these is China’s rapid military modernisation and increasing number of hostile acts under the threshold of war.
Here is how to protect the EU against Chinese electric vehicles and wind energy
The EU is gearing up for a fight with Beijing over China’s unfair green tech trade practices. Policymakers fear that Europe’s car and wind turbine manufacturers will be wiped out, just as happened with EU solar panel production years ago. To start addressing this problem, Brussels has resorted to the same tool in both cases: subsidy probes. However, these sectors carry different risks.
Action on Critical Minerals Is Needed Now
As tensions between China and its major trading partners escalate, Beijing has a powerful card to play — its near monopoly on the mining and processing of a wide variety of critical minerals.
Action on critical minerals is needed now
Joris Teer is a strategic analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. Chris Miller is an associate professor at the Fletcher Schhol, Tufts University and the author of “Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology.” As tensions between China and its major trading partners escalate, Beijing has a powerful card to play — its near monopoly on the mining and processing of a wide variety of critical minerals.
Voorkom dat China militaire technologie bemachtigt
In 2021 overleden zowel de ‘vader van de Pakistaanse atoombom’, Abdul Qadeer Khan, als de Nederlandse collega, Frits Veerman, die hem in de jaren zeventig op spionage-activiteiten betrapte. Hun beider werkgever en ook de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (voorganger van de AIVD) wilden niets horen over Veermans vermoedens dat Khan ultracentrifugetechnologie stal in Nederland, betoogt Dirk van Delft overtuigend in zijn boek Splijtstof. Eerst maakte Khan zijn vaderland geopolitiek buutvrij.
If China Attacks Taiwan, What Will Europe Do?
If China Attacks Taiwan, What Will Europe Do? Any decisions made in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan are likely to determine Europe’s place in the world for decades to come. Read Full Article »
If China Attacks Taiwan, What Will Europe Do?
Features | Security | East Asia Any decisions made in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan are likely to determine Europe’s place in the world for decades to come. A Chinese J-16 fighter jet aircraft flies in Taiwan’s ADIZ on October 4, 2021. Credit: Republic of China (ROC) Ministry of National Defense Image the following scenario: It’s April 10, 2024 at 2:30 a.m. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte convenes his cabinet to discuss an emergency request from the United States.
Not Trump or Johnson, but Xi Jinping who has the most to lose in Persian Gulf Crisis
Commentators in the West discuss the current crisis in the Persian Gulf as if we still live in the 1980s. Their focus on either American troop deployment or the seizure of the British flagged oil tanker Stena Impero paint the picture of a conflict that has two parties: Iran and the West. The broader geopolitical reality of the conflict remains ignored: competition between rising power China and ruling power America. Beijing intends to build up Iran as a corner stone of its new world order.
Bekijk Golf-conflict niet louter door een westerse bril
De Iraanse president Rohani (rechts) tijdens een onderhoud met de Chinese president Xi Jinping in Teheran. Beeld EPA In het Westen beschouwen we de nieuwe crisis in de Perzische Golf alsof we nog in de jaren tachtig leven. De Amerikaanse troepenopbouw en de kaping van de onder Britse vlag varende olietanker Stena Impero creëren het beeld van een conflict waarbij er slechts twee partijen zijn: Iran en het Westen.
Xi's New Era may complicate Trump's plans for Iran
When it came to negotiating with the Iranian regime about its nuclear adventures, China had the most leverage. That is, economically China was the only country still willing to develop Iran’s vital oil and gas fields. In 2014, China accounted for close to 40 percent of total Iranian oil exports. Militarily, China delivered around 70 percent of all weapons imported by Iran in 2012, 2014 and 2015.
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