Your browser does not support the audio element. Listen to article [[duration]] minutes Google’s introducing a 2029 timeline to secure the quantum era with post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration. Last month, we called to secure the quantum era before a future quantum computer can break current encryption. This new timeline reflects migration needs for the PQC era in light of progress on quantum computing hardware development, quantum error correction, and quantum factoring resource estimates.
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Articles by Sophie Schmieg
ML-KEM Mythbusting
There have been some recent concerns about ML-KEM, NIST’s standard for encryption with Post-Quantum Cryptography, related standards of the IETF, and lots of conspiracy theories about malicious actors subverting the standardization process. As someone who has been involved with this standardization process at pretty much every level, here a quick debunking of the various nonsense I have heard. So let’s get started, FAQ style.
There is no Diffie-Hellman but Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
When I first learned about Diffie-Hellman and especially elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman, I had one rather obvious question: Why elliptic curves? Why use this strange group that seems rather arbitrary, with its third intersection of a line and then reflected? Why not use, say, the Monster Group?
🔒 Tracking the Cost of Quantum Factoring
Google Quantum AI's mission is to build best in class quantum computing for otherwise unsolvable problems. For decades the quantum and security communities have also known that large-scale quantum computers will at some point in the future likely be able to break many of today’s secure public key cryptography algorithms, such as Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA).
How not to format a private key
Last time I had an issue with standardization going into the, in my opinion, wrong direction, I wrote a blog post about it. Much to my own surprise, that actually worked, and as a reward you get more blog posts about somewhat convoluted standardization issues. In order to entice you to at least skim the background section, here a bit of a teaser: Do you like undefined behavior?
HashML-DSA considered harmful
I mentioned ranted about this topic as a section of a previous blog post (at the very end), but the topic keeps coming up, so I am escalating to a full blog post, since obviously that will help with all these people who are wrong on the internet standardization. Prehashing is a paradigm often used within the context of digital signature schemes.
Reconstructing public keys from signatures
One weird hobby of mine is reasonable properties of cryptographic schemes that nobody promised they do or don’t have. Whether that’s invisible salamanders or binding through shared secrets, anything that isn’t just boring IND-CCA2 or existential unforgeability is just delightful material to construct vulnerabilities with. Normally, with a signature scheme, you have the public key and want to know whether a given signature is valid.
Unbindable Kemmy Schmidt: ML-KEM is neither MAL-BIND-K-CT nor MAL-BIND-K-PK
Paper 2024/523 , Google Abstract In "Keeping up with the KEMs" Cremers et al. introduced various binding models for KEMs. The authors show that ML-KEM is LEAK-BIND-K-CT and LEAK-BIND-K-PK, i.e. binding the ciphertext and the public key in the case of an adversary having access, but not being able to manipulate the key material.
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