Skip To Main Content
Vanesa Daza on Muck Rack

Vanesa Daza

As seen in: arXiv
Is this you? As a journalist, you can create a free Muck Rack account to customize your profile, list your contact preferences, and upload a portfolio of your best work. Claim your profile
Back to Vanesa Daza’s profile

Articles by Vanesa Daza

[2301.12818] Private, Anonymous, Collateralizable Commitments vs. MEV

|
By Vanesa Daza, Xavier Salleras
| arXiv
[Submitted on 30 Jan 2023 ( v1 ), last revised 22 Mar 2024 (this version, v2)] Title:Private, Anonymous, Collateralizable Commitments vs. MEV Download a PDF of the paper titled Private, Anonymous, Collateralizable Commitments vs. MEV, by Conor McMenamin and Vanesa Daza and Xavier Salleras Download PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract:In this work, we introduce the private, anonymous, collateralizable commitments (PACCs) framework.
Open in Who Shared Issue with article?

Do not rug on me: Zero-dimensional Scam Detection

|
By Vanesa Daza, Victor Adan
| arXiv
In just 3 minutes help us understand how you see arXiv.
Open in Who Shared View Duplicates (23) Issue with article?

Diamonds are Forever, Loss-Versus-Rebalancing is Not

|
By Conor McMenamin, Vanesa Daza, Bruno Mazorra, Pompeu Fabra
| eprint.iacr.org
Paper 2022/1420 Diamonds are Forever, Loss-Versus-Rebalancing is Not , Pompeu Fabra University , Pompeu Fabra University, CYBERCAT , Pompeu Fabra University Abstract The always-available liquidity of automated market makers (AMMs) has been one of the most important catalysts in early cryptocurrency adoption. However, it has become increasingly evident that AMMs in their current form are not viable investment options for passive liquidity providers.
Open in Who Shared Issue with article?

FairTraDEX: A Decentralised Exchange Preventing Value Extraction

|
By Matthias Fitzi, Padraic O'Donoghue, Conor McMenamin, Vanesa Daza
| eprint.iacr.org
Paper 2022/155 FairTraDEX: A Decentralised Exchange Preventing Value Extraction Abstract We present FairTraDEX, a decentralized exchange (DEX) protocol based on frequent batch auctions (FBAs), which provides formal game-theoretic guarantees against extractable value. FBAs when run by a trusted third-party provide unique game-theoretic optimal strategies which ensure players are shown prices equal to the liquidity provider's fair price, excluding explicit, pre-determined fees.
Open in Who Shared Issue with article?
Show More