Barton E. Lee

English Français Deutsch Italiano 中文 More Español Ελληνικά 日本語 Português Türkçe We argue that in market democracies firms can wield political power through a mechanism that does not rely on lobbying, campaign contributions, or persuasion. When voters cannot commit to future regulation, firms can use irreversible technological investments to reshape ex-post political incentives. We call this mechanism the political hold-up problem.

In new research, Marc Jacob, Barton E. Lee and Gabriele Gratton argue that legislative gridlock is not only a consequence of Congress’ polarization but also a cause of it. In sum, both polarization and gridlock fuel one another generating a vicious spiral toward political mire. The United States Congress is breaking records for all the wrong reasons.

Expert civil servants devise ever more sophisticated policies to tackle emergencies such as climate change. But when voters lose faith in experts, they vote for anti-elite populist leaders who promise to drain the swamp in the civil service. Gabriele Gratton and Barton E. Lee write that understanding populist voters’ calculations and mistrust is key to designing democratic institutions that can address the most pressing challenges of our times. Climate change’s devastating effects are here.