The Myth of Military Victory The Dangerous Idea Driving Today’s Wars of Choice Read Full Article »
Stephen Biddle
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Articles by Stephen Biddle
The Myth of Military Victory
Military victory is an alluring idea. A short, violent campaign that defeats the enemy promises payoffs at a tolerable price. The Trump administration expected such an outcome in Iran in February 2026. The Netanyahu government sought it in Gaza in October 2023, then in Lebanon and Iran. Russian President Vladimir Putin assumed his 2022 invasion of Ukraine would deliver it.
The Limits of Naval Technology Alone
Editor’s Note: Better technology and greater numbers help win wars, but by themselves these factors are not always decisive. Drawing on lessons from World War II, Georgetown University’s John Severini and Columbia University’s Stephen Biddle look at the U.S.-China naval balance and point to the role of organizational and doctrinal factors in shaping victory.
The Price of Strategic Incoherence in Iran
Contrary to the Trump administration’s callous public relations campaign early in the onslaught against Iran, war is not a movie or a video game. Starting a war is a decision to kill real people, destroy property, and divert limited resources from other priorities. For such moral and material costs to be acceptable, they have to be for a good purpose. No purpose will be good enough, however, unless it is accompanied by a strategy that can achieve that purpose at an acceptable price.
Technology, Behavior, and Effectiveness in Naval Warfare: The Battles of Savo Island and Cape Saint George
International Security International Security is America's leading peer-reviewed journal of security affairs. International Security Article from International Security Open Access Published: Winter 2025/26 Smoke billows from the USS Yorktown and bursts from anti-aircraft fire fill the air after a Japanese bomber hit the aircraft carrier in the Battle of Midway near Midway Islands during World War II in June 1942. Most political science research on military effectiveness focuses on land combat.
Does America Face a “Ship Gap” With China?
Over the past few years, concerns about China’s navy and its potential threat to U.S. interests have steadily grown. Two decades ago, the U.S. Navy had 282 battle-force ships against the Chinese navy’s 220, but by the mid-2010sthis advantage had disappeared. Today, Chinese ships outnumber those of the U.S. Navy 400 to 295. If the United States’ shipbuilding pace remains unchanged, this so-called ship gap will only continue to grow.
China Doesn’t Want to Lead an Axis
China and Russia’s 2022 proclamation of a “no limits” partnership with “no ‘forbidden’ areas” has had a far-reaching effect. The agreement implied that Beijing and Moscow were about to resurrect their long-defunct alliance that, when it briefly bound the two powers in the 1950s, projected a formidable threat that the United States could not afford to leave unchallenged.
The False Promise of Ukraine’s Deep Strikes Into Russia
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States has provided Kyiv with extensive military aid. But that aid has long been subject to restrictions. Some have to do with the type of equipment provided, such as limits on transfers of long-range missiles or aircraft. Others constrain how U.S. weapons can be used.
Military Effectiveness and Naval Warfare
Abstract Military effectiveness created a growth in political science literature. However, this work focused overwhelmingly on continental warfare. China’s rise highlights naval warfare. Do the central findings of the literature hold for war at sea? We explore this question by comparing naval and land combat patterns via a new dataset on interstate surface naval battles fought between 1649 and 1988.
Anti-satellite warfare, proliferated satellites, and the future of space-based military surveillance
ABSTRACT Will proliferated satellites enable a transparent battlefield in a way that might transform continental warfare? Many now think so. We argue, however, that anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities will limit satellites’ potential contribution, but only if land forces adapt by deploying ground-based jamming and dazzling technologies.
How Russia Stopped Ukraine’s Momentum
Many held high hopes for Ukraine’s 2023 summer offensive. Previous Ukrainian successes at Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson encouraged expectations that a new effort, reinforced with new Western equipment and training, might rupture Russian defenses on a larger scale and sever the Russian land bridge to Crimea. If it did, the thinking went, the resulting threat to Crimea might persuade Putin to end the war. The results fell far short of such hopes.
How Russia Stopped Ukraine’s Momentum
A Deep Defense Is Hard to Beat Many held high hopes for Ukraine’s 2023 summer offensive. Previous Ukrainian successes at Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Khersonencouraged expectations that a new effort, reinforced with new Western equipment and training, might rupture Russian defenses on a larger scale and sever the Russian land bridge to Crimea. If it did, the thinking went, the resulting threat to Crimea might persuade Putin to end the war. Read Full Article »
How Russia Stopped Ukraine’s Momentum
Many held high hopes for Ukraine’s 2023 summer offensive. Previous Ukrainian successes at Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Khersonencouraged expectations that a new effort, reinforced with new Western equipment and training, might rupture Russian defenses on a larger scale and sever the Russian land bridge to Crimea. If it did, the thinking went, the resulting threat to Crimea might persuade Putin to end the war. The results fell far short of such hopes.
1/29/24 National Security News and Commentary
Korea has not been the only battleground since the end of the Second World War. Men have fought and died in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in Algeria and Cuba and Cyprus, and almost continuously on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear retaliation has been considered appropriate.
Back in the Trenches: Why New Technology Hasn’t Revolutionized Warfare in Ukraine - Tribune Content Agency (August 22, 2023)
The war in Ukraine is being waged with a host of advanced technologies, from remotely operated drones to space-based surveillance, precision weapons, hypersonic missiles, handheld jammers, artificial intelligence, networked communications, and more.
Why new tech hasn’t revolutionized warfare in Ukraine Original
The Ukraine war is being waged with a host of advanced technologies. Many believe this is transforming warfare, with omnipresent surveillance combining with newly lethal weapons to make legacy systems such as the tank obsolete and to make traditional methods such as large-scale offensive action impractical. But in other ways this war seems very old. It features foot soldiers slogging through muddy trenches in scenes that look more like World War I than Star Wars.
Back in the Trenches
The war in Ukraine is being waged with a host of advanced technologies, from remotely operated drones to space-based surveillance, precision weapons, hypersonic missiles, handheld jammers, artificial intelligence, networked communications, and more. Many argue that this array is transforming warfare, with omnipresent surveillance combining with newly lethal weapons to make legacy systems such as the tank obsolete and to make traditional methods such as large-scale offensive action impractical.
Ukraine-Krieg: Militärische Erkenntnisse für andere Krisen
Keine Krise, die nicht auch für etwas gut wäre: US-Militärexperten analysieren den Ukraine-Krieg ganz genau - um Erkenntnisse für andere, folgende Konflikte zu gewinnen. Der Grabenkrieg und die Panzergefechte in der Ukraine wirken anachronistisch. Dennoch ziehen US-Experten aus dem Konflikt wichtige Erkenntnisse für mögliche künftige militärische Konflikte, etwa in Taiwan oder im Nahen Osten.
8/28/24 National Security News and Commentary
Quotes of the Day: “I am not influenced by the expectation of promotion or pecuniary reward. I wish to be useful, and every kind of service necessary for the public good, becomes honorable by being necessary.
Ukraine and the Future of Offensive Maneuver
Editor’s note: This is the first installment of a two-part series on the contemporary challenges to offensive maneuver based on observations from the war in Ukraine, and the implications for the U.S. Army. For months, commentary on Ukraine focused on stalemate and the prospect that changing technology augured a looming age of defense dominance in warfare. Russia’s assault on Kyiv had failed. Its assault on Odessa had ground to a halt well short of the city.
Is there a difference between 'defensive' and 'offensive' weapons?
Placeholder while article actions load As the war in Ukraine enters its third month, many in the West support helping Ukraine to defend itself against Russian aggression. However, the United States and its NATO allies want to avoid a direct conflict with Russia that might escalate, possibly to a nuclear confrontation. These competing goals have encouraged many Western countries to argue that they are providing only "defensive" weapons to Ukraine.
Arming Ukraine Is Worth the Risk
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has spurred a tidal wave of arms transfers from the West to the besieged country. The United States alone has committed $1 billion worth of arms to Ukraine this year. More than 20 other countries have promised, sent, or assisted in moving arms and equipment to Ukraine.
COP26: Low carbon energy sources - a guide to renewables
COP26 is creating confusion and expectation. The question that emerges, is regardless of the politicians, what can I do personally? The problem is there’s a bewildering number of terms, which many of us don’t always understand. And frequently we’ll see people debating the merits of one renewable technology over another, but we’re unable to engage due to a lack of knowledge about how they can best be evaluated.
Analysis | Afghanistan’s security forces unraveled this month. What broke their seven-year stalemate with the Taliban?
The sudden collapse of Afghanistan’s security forces this month surprised many, apparently including the Biden administration. Afghanistan’s security forces received more than $80 billion in U.S. weapons and equipment since 2001. They fielded more than 250,000 combatants at their peak, guided by thousands of U.S. military advisers. They had maintained a rough stalemate with the Taliban for more than seven years, after the Obama administration announced the end of U.S. combat operations in 2014.
Ending the War in Afghanistan
International forces in Afghanistan are preparing to hand over responsibility for security to Afghan soldiers and police by the end of 2014. U.S. President Barack Obama has argued that battlefield successes since 2009 have enabled this transition and that with it, “this long war will come to a responsible end.” But the war will not end in 2014. The U.S. role may end, in whole or in part, but the war will continue—and its ultimate outcome is very much in doubt.
Defining Success in Afghanistan
The original plan for a post-Taliban Afghanistan called for rapid, transformational nation building. But such a vision no longer appears feasible, if it ever was. Many Americans are now skeptical that even a stable and acceptable outcome in Afghanistan is possible. They believe that Afghanistan has never been administered effectively and is simply ungovernable.
Roundtable 12-9 on Information Technology and Military Power
War is a complex and chaotic business that persistently confounds the attempts of frontline forces, junior officers, field commanders, campaign commanders, policy elites, and others to understand what is happening amidst the smoke, noise, violence, and confusion. This has not, however, stopped war’s many participants from trying to discern the ebbs and flows of battle and use whatever information can be gleaned to chart the most propitious path forward.
A Review of "Nonstate Warfare" by Stephen Biddle and "Airpower in the War against ISIS" by Benjamin S. Lambeth| Foreign Affairs
Two books raise awkward questions about whether the United States truly understands the military challenges it faces. In an important and innovative analysis, Biddle takes issue with what he sees as a lazy distinction between the regular military strategy of states and the guerrilla techniques of nonstate actors. He sees instead a spectrum of methods, with those intended for decisive battle at one end and those intended to help avoid battle at the other.
What to Do About ISIS?
Murad Sezer / Reuters Rodi Said / Reuters Leave Root Causes Aside—Destroy the ISIS ‘State’ Of course it would be daunting to solve the conflicts the Islamic State feeds on. But that isn’t, or shouldn’t be, the mission. Thaier Al-Sudani / Reuters America Can’t Do Much About ISIS That leaves patience, containment, and humanitarian aid as the least-bad policies while waiting for this awful war to play itself out.
Wartime Lessons for Industrial Mobilization in a Time of Pandemic
Stephen Biddle & Tami Davis Biddle, War on the Rocks April 4, 2020 Some six months after Pearl Harbor, with American industry in a desperate rush to build tanks, planes and ships to defeat Japan, the Higgins shipyard had no choice but to relinquish a contract it had signed only months earlier to build cargo ships. Higgins lacked the steel it needed.
Wartime Lessons for Industrial Mobilization in a Time of Pandemic - War on the Rocks
Some six months after Pearl Harbor, with American industry in a desperate rush to build tanks, planes and ships to defeat Japan, the Higgins shipyard had no choice but to relinquish a contract it had signed only months earlier to build cargo ships. Higgins lacked the steel it needed.
Afghanistan Going Forward: Surge, Negotiate, or Get Out?
Sixteen years ago, the United States initiated combat operations in Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Goals have changed marginally over the years, but they typically include defeating al Qaeda and other terrorist groups with global reach, strengthening the Afghan government and security forces to prevent the Taliban from retaking political power, and denying terrorists a safe haven.
Syria Airstrikes: Trump’s Appetite For Risk Spells Trouble
Thursday night’s cruise missile attack on a Syrian airbase will be much debated in coming weeks. Critics will cite the danger of escalation or of ensnarement in a quagmire. Supporters will cite the danger of inaction. Russian and Iranian reactions will be scrutinized. All of this is important, but it misses an arguably bigger issue: how bold and risk-seeking do Americans really want the President to be? Attacks like Thursday night’s are always gambles. They might work.
The U.S. Should Contain ISIS and Move On
It’s a wiser choice than the ‘destroy IS’ or ‘smash-and-leave’ options. In recent weeks, ISIS has suffered territorial losses on multiple fronts, including in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The organization may look nearer to defeat than at any time in the past two years, but there is still a great deal of fighting to be done before the group is destroyed, or more likely beaten back to an underground terrorist organization as it was in 2009.
The Problem With Vows to 'Defeat' the Islamic State
What happens after Raqqa falls? By Stephen Biddle and Jacob Shapiro Smoke rises after an U.S.-led air strike in Kobani, Syria (Murad Sezer / Reuters) In recent weeks, ISIS has suffered territorial losses on multiple fronts, including in Iraq, Libya, and Syria.
Can the United States Command the Commons in East Asia? - Harvard - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Policy Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School Authors: Stephen Biddle, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1985–1987; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security, Ivan Oelrich, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1988-1989 This policy brief is based on "Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,"...
"Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia"
Authors: Stephen Biddle, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1985–1987; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security, Ivan Oelrich, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1988-1989 Many policy analysts have suggested that China is developing antiaccess and area denial capabilities that could force the U.S. military out of the Western Pacific. The threat, however, is limited.
Afghanistan Needs a Settlement, Not Another Troop-Withdrawal Deadline
The U.S. objective in Afghanistan is not to leave; it is to end the war on terms Americans and Afghans can live with. The new commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, Gen. John Nicholson, will soon complete an assessment that is expected to call for more U.S. troops than the Obama Administration has planned. Current policy calls for reducing the U.S. presence in Afghanistan from today’s 9,800 troops to 5,500 by the end of this year.
Patience and Containment Are the Best Policies Against ISIS
In 2003, David Petraeus, then a division commander in Iraq, famously asked “tell me how this ends?” in reference to the conflict just starting there. It was a good question then, and it’s a good question now. The war against the Islamic State gets a lot of attention, much of it focused on the immediate: Is the war going better or worse this month than last month? Is the Islamic State gaining ground or losing it? Are U.S. air strikes killing more Islamic State leaders or fewer?
America Can't Do Much About ISIS
In 2003, David Petraeus, then a division commander in Iraq, famously asked “tell me how this ends?” in reference to the conflict just starting there. It was a good question then, and it’s a good question now. The war against the Islamic State gets a lot of attention, much of it focused on the immediate: Is the war going better or worse this month than last month? Is the Islamic State gaining ground or losing it? Are U.S. air strikes killing more Islamic State leaders or fewer?
Here’s why we can only contain the Islamic State, not bomb it back to the Stone Age
Critics have long called the U.S.’s Syria policy feckless. But the Paris attacks brought this to a head, with renewed calls for escalation to end the Islamic State’s threat and prevent another Paris. But the critics’ policies won’t end the threat either. More than a decade of continuous warfare against militants in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere have taught us a great deal about what works, what doesn’t, and why.
Stop Putting Afghanistan on a Deadline
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is now in Washington, and it looks like he will bring home an extension in the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. But it’s not much of a presence, and it’s not much of an extension. In fact, it’s mostly an extension of the same pattern of mistakes that have left the country in such a parlous state today.
The Iraq We Left Behind
Nine years after U.S. troops toppled Saddam Hussein and just a few months after the last U.S. soldier left Iraq, the country has become something close to a failed state. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki presides over a system rife with corruption and brutality, in which political leaders use security forces and militias to repress enemies and intimidate the general population. The law exists as a weapon to be wielded against rivals and to hide the misdeeds of allies.
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