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Articles by Yaron Yehezkel
“For the public benefit”: data policy in platform markets
Home | Faculty & Research Overview | Research We consider the public-good aspect of platform’s data-collection on users. Data has commercial-benefit to the platform, personal-benefit to the user, and public-benefit to other users. We ask who should decide which data the platform commercializes. We find that the answer depends on the type of heterogeneity in the disutility from data commercialization.
Competing for cookies: Platforms’ business models in data markets with network effects
Home | Faculty & Research Overview | Research We consider platform competition when platforms can either 1) commercialize users’ data and in return offer their services for free (data-based business model); 2) protect users’ data and charge users for participation (subscription-based model); or 3) offer both options (the hybrid model). We find that competition does not always motivate the incumbent platform to protect users’ data.
“For the public benefit”: Data policy in platform markets
1 INTRODUCTION Many platforms base their business model on the commercialization of consumers' data. For example, search engines such as Google can collect data on users' locations and keyword searches. Navigation apps such as Waze can collect data on users' preferred routes and other driving habits. Media streaming platforms such as Spotify, Pandora, and Deezer can collect data on users' music preferences and listening habits.
Vertical Collusion to Exclude Product Improvement*
1 INTRODUCTION It is often the case that an established product is challenged by a new product, which is first inferior to the established product. Nevertheless, this new product may often have the potential for improvement, if it is supplied and sold to consumers. For example, consumers may not be aware of the new product's virtues, and only if it is sold, and consumers try it, their demand for it increases (Guadagni and Little [1983]; Osborne [2011]; Seetharaman et al. [1999]).
Collusion Between Supply Chains under Asymmetric Information*
1 INTRODUCTION Competition between vertical manufacturer-retailer supply chains may involve both repeated interaction between the supply chains and long-term relationship within each supply chain. Manufacturers typically engage in an on-going competition with other manufacturers. Such repeated interaction enables manufacturers to horizontally collude on restricting competition.
Regulating Platform Competition in Markets with Network Externalities: Will Predatory Pricing Restrictions Increase Social Welfare?*
1 INTRODUCTION When platforms compete in a market with network externalities, users' decision as to which platform to join is based not only on the intrinsic quality of the platforms' services or products, but also on the consumer's expectations regarding the platforms' ability to attract other users. An incumbent platform can benefit from a focal position, in that users expect other users to join the incumbent, even when an entrant platform offers a superior quality.
Secret cartels add to Israel's high cost of living
It is likely that one of the reasons for the high cost of living in Israel is a phenomenon called a "vertical secret cartel." A cartel is an agreement between competitors not to compete with each other and is prohibited by antitrust laws. The problem is that rivals may collude to set a cartel-like price, without any communication between them (hidden cartel).
“For the Public Benefit”: Who Should Control Our Data?
Data-driven platforms collect and commercialize users’ data through advertisements or by selling the data to other third part providers. This practice raises the question of who should have the right to decide which data to collect and commercialize, users or the platform? In this article, we describe the results of our research concerning regulating platforms’ data collection.
Secret cartels add to Israel's high cost of living
It is likely that one of the reasons for the high cost of living in Israel is a phenomenon called a "vertical secret cartel." A cartel is an agreement between competitors not to compete with each other, and is prohibited by antitrust laws. The problem is that rivals may collude to set a cartel-like price, without any communication between them (hidden cartel).
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