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Articles by Joseph DeThomas
UN Panel of Experts: The Final Act
The United Nations (UN) Panel of Experts (POE) established under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1874 published its final report on March 7 of this year. Following the Russian veto of the Council resolution renewing the Panel’s mandate, the finality of that report has to be taken quite literally. This will be a loss for those interested in the health of the global nonproliferation regime, the state of the UN, and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Sanctions and North Korea: The Good Old Days Are Gone for Good
“It isn’t necessary to imagine the world ending in fire or ice. There are two other possibilities: one is paperwork, and the other is nostalgia.” Frank Zappa “Nostalgia is a seductive liar.” George Ball I spent last New Year’s Eve celebrating the end of 2023 with a group of expatriate Russians, some of whom fled during the Soviet era and others who had just arrived in flight from the catastrophe that is the Putin regime and its invasion of Ukraine.
Improving North Korean Defector Integration in South Korea: Survey Findings and Recommendations
Commentary, Human Security It is Seoul’s responsibility to promote and ensure the integration of just under 34,000 resettled defector-migrant North Koreans into the Republic of Korea’s (ROK or South Korea) national fabric, but it is not always easy to say what this looks like in practice. When defector-migrants experience second-rate treatment in society, the challenge to integration is clear.
Yoon’s Key North Korea Challenges: Pyongyang’s Increasing Hostility and Washington’s Backslide Into Strategic Patience
In 2018, North Korea emphasized the importance of the “powerful socialist country” discourse in becoming a “normal state” in the international community.
Another data point on North Korea and the world economy
April 25, 2022 North Korean Economy Watch Our researchers have shared with us articles from their own pages. Please take a moment to view the article from its original source. View By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein At 38 North, I recently looked at how world market price swings impact the North Korean economy. Given the lack of consistent price data for coal in North Korea, I was unable to look at the potential impact of global coal price changes on domestic prices (and export prices) in North Korea.
Thin Soup From a Bare Cupboard: The Latest Sanctions on North Korea
By: Joseph DeThomas April 19, 2022 Commentary, Foreign Affairs In April, the US government’s (USG) response to recent North Korean missile tests was directed at one significant North Korean government entity—the Ministry of Rocket Industry—and four of its front companies. Several weeks earlier, the USG sanctioned three firms and two individuals from the Russian Far East for violating North Korean sanctions.
What to Expect for US-ROK and Inter-Korean Relations Under Yoon Suk-yeol
Commentary, Foreign Affairs 2022 Election Outcome On March 9, the conservative People Power Party’s candidate, Yoon Suk-yeol, was elected the next president of South Korea, with 48.56 percent of the electorate vote over his main opponent, Democratic Party’s Lee Jae Myung, 47.83 percent.
South Korea’s Formal Membership in the Quad Plus: A Bridge Too Far?
Commentary On September 24, the four leaders of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) countries held their first in-person summit, solidifying the partnership between the United States, Australia, India and Japan in the face of pressing issues facing the Indo-Pacific.
The North Korean-Syrian Partnership: Bright Prospects Ahead
By: Samuel Ramani March 23, 2021 Foreign Affairs (Source: Syrian Arab News Agency) As the Syrian civil war passes its tenth anniversary, President Bashar al-Assad is seeking to escape international isolation and preserve Damascus’s wartime partnerships. While Syria is primarily focused on returning to the Arab League and courting reconstruction investments from China, Russia and Iran, it also wishes to preserve its historic relationship with North Korea.
Return of the Foreign Ministry: Choe Son Hui’s Message to the US
By: 38 North March 18, 2021 Commentary, Foreign Affairs, Media Analysis (Source: US State Department) Following Kim Yo Jong’s March 16 statement, which had signaled the door was open for US-DPRK engagement at some point, First Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui issued a statement on March 18 focusing on the current state of US-DPRK relations.[1] Given that there has been nothing from the Foreign Ministry on relations with the US since July 2020, Choe’s comments suggests, first and foremost,...
Kim Yo Jong Breaks the Silence, but What Does It Mean?
By: 38 North March 16, 2021 Commentary, Media Analysis The latest reports about US outreach to North Korea via various channels going unmet has sparked much discussion since the news broke last Friday. It may simply mean that North Korea hasn’t decided its approach to the US yet. Or the question might be, is the game afoot? Kim Yo Jong is seen at the Sixth National Conference of War Veterans in Pyongyang on July 27, 2020.
North Korea Sanctions: We Don't Have the Cards
I never miss a chance to listen to my old friend and colleague, Evans Revere, when it comes to North Korea. In his recent piece, he asserts that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is in severe economic straits.[1] If the Biden administration is to have any hope of achieving the goal of North Korean denuclearization, it has to move now to impose sanctions far more severe than any that have been tried before. As he writes, Read Full Article »
Achieving North Korean Denuclearization With More Draconian Sanctions: We Don’t Have the Cards
By: Joseph DeThomas March 3, 2021 Commentary, Foreign Affairs I never miss a chance to listen to my old friend and colleague, Evans Revere, when it comes to North Korea. In his recent piece, he asserts that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is in severe economic straits.[1] If the Biden administration is to have any hope of achieving the goal of North Korean denuclearization, it has to move now to impose sanctions far more severe than any that have been tried before. As he writes, .
Deterring North Korea: The Need for Collective Resolve and Alliance Transformation
By: S. Paul Choi July 23, 2020 Foreign Affairs The policies of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States (US) toward North Korea (DPRK) are again at a crossroads. And as is often the case, the North Korean government, taking bellicose actions and engaging in threatening rhetoric, is manipulating the strategic environment to shape the way forward. The initial responses from the Trump and Moon administrations have been prudent.
Alternative Futures for the US-ROK Alliance: Will Things Fall Apart?
By: Clint Work May 7, 2020 Commentary Executive Summary Over the last several months, 38 North held discussions with a broad range of former high-level US and ROK political, diplomatic and military officials as well as various analysts and academics. The following key points emerged from our discussions: The US-ROK alliance faces several challenges to its continued cohesion, raising serious questions about its capacity to adapt to structural and strategic shifts buffeting the relationship.
Takeaways From the UN Panel of Experts Report: The Coast Is Clear
By: Joseph DeThomas May 5, 2020 Commentary, Foreign Affairs The president of the United Nations (UN) Security Council released the final report of the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea on April 13.[1] The takeaways are clear if not very welcome for champions of sanctions who believe that turning up the screws on “maximum pressure” will force North Korea to capitulate to US demands on denuclearization: North Korea has managed to develop successful evasion strategies to cope with the most...
The Many Faces of Chairman Kim Jong Un
By: Kenneth B. Dekleva M.D. January 30, 2020 Commentary Photo: KCNA At the recent December 2019 plenum, Chairman Kim, rather than giving his traditional New Year’s speech, outlined a different strategy toward the US moving forward in 2020. In doing so, he highlighted the dignity of the country, a return to a combination of military and economic development, and the requirement for the people to tighten their belts during a period of prolonged sanctions.
Sanctions: This Time It Will Work for Sure!
By: Joseph DeThomas January 28, 2020 Commentary, Foreign Affairs I have not written about North Korean sanctions for some time, having pronounced them dead in 2018. True, I suggested in that last article that the remains of the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure policy” would stumble around in a zombie-like state in Washington policy circles for a while.
A Republican Paradigm Shift on North Korea: Prospects and Implications
By: Ferial A. Saeed July 26, 2019 Commentary One of the most consequential shifts in American foreign policy may occur sometime before the 2020 election. Conditions are ripe for a Republican president to strike a deal that could substantially reduce but not eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat.
Are Sanctions Part of the Problem?
Unlike much of US policy towards North Korea, its sanctions strategy has remained constant. Particularly since 2016, its primary objective has been to create regime-threatening economic pressure on the DPRK. Washington has attempted to do this by denying the North opportunities to earn foreign exchange through the export of commodities or labor and reducing the import of petroleum or petroleum products.
‘Getting Past No’ with Kim Jong Un: The Psychology of Negotiation, and Kim’s ‘Art of the Deal’
In the late 1960s, a delicate opening of diplomacy to China began under auspices similar to those seen today in the recent diplomatic initiatives by North Korea, South Korea and the United States. It involved reaching out to a nuclear-armed nation with whom the US had not had diplomatic relations for several decades, a nation whose rhetoric and threat perception bore similarity—until 2018—to the missives coming from North Korea’s official media and foreign ministry.
Pyongyang’s Brushback Pitch
North Korea has just delivered a brushback pitch, warning the United States and South Korea that inclusion of nuclear assets like the B-52s in joint military exercises—not the exercises themselves—is inconsistent with President Trump’s pledge at President Moon’s urging to move toward peace in Korea. And peace is a critical part of Pyongyang’s aim in its diplomatic give-and-take with Washington and Seoul. That’s why US and South Korean military authorities were right to cancel the B-52 flights.
Obituary: The Maximum Pressure Policy
A family spokesman confirmed today that the maximum pressure policy passed away on April 27, 2018. This was not noticed at the time since it was still walking around in policy circles in Washington, but physicians later determined that the policy lost all ability to affect the outside world sometime between the moment that Kim Jong Un trod on the red carpet in Beijing and the second he crossed the line into the ROK sector in Panmunjom.
Please Go, But Not Quite Yet: The Question of US Troops in South Korea
In the run up to what is certainly going to be one summit (North-South Korea) and possibly a second (US-DPRK), most observers are focusing on the nuclear issue. In a contagion of self-hypnosis, pundits are walking around muttering the word “denuclearization” over and over. By contrast, we can be sure the North Koreans are alert and awake, confident in the knowledge that Kim Jong Un has a full range of options. His possible menu is long and varied—baked, fried, parboiled, steamed.
Early returns show North Korea sanctions hold promise
The Trump administration is betting a great deal on the effectiveness of sanctions on North Korea. Its policy of “maximum pressure” in order to get North Korea to denuclearize rests on wide-ranging economic sanctions.
The Lamps are Going Out in Asia
“The lamps are going out all over Europe. We shall not see them lit again in our lifetime.” — Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, August 3, 1914 US President Donald Trump’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 19 may well come to be viewed as “historic,” but not in a good way. This article will leave for others the impact of Donald Trump’s and Kim Jong Un’s reality TV show rhetoric.
The Future of North Korean Nuclear Delivery Systems
Pyongyang’s inventory of delivery systems is a key factor in considering North Korea’s nuclear future. While its current inventory is well developed, although limited to old Soviet technology only able to reach regional targets, North Korea has bigger ambitions and is seriously pursuing the deployment of more capable, longer-range, more survivable weapons.
North Korea’s Cyber Capabilities: Deterrence and Stability in a Changing Strategic Environment
In addition to long-standing international concerns about North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and technology, the US and its regional allies—the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan—are increasingly worried about the DPRK’s growing cyber offensive capabilities.
Alliance Military Strategy in the Shadow of North Korea's Nuclear Futures
In the early decades of the Cold War when North Korea maintained only a large conventional force, alliance strategy depended on technological superiority. As North Korea gradually acquired cruise and short-range ballistic missile capabilities in addition to its conventional forces, the US nuclear umbrella and alliance missile defense capabilities took on greater salience.
The New US Sanctions: Moving From Sanctions To Economic War
President Trump’s new Executive Order on North Korea sanctions is a unilateral declaration of economic warfare designed to bring the North to its knees through the aggressive use of secondary sanctions against any country that trades with or finances trade with North Korea. Rather than bring North Korea closer to the negotiating table for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, they are likely to hasten war and even the collapse of the regime if effectively enforced.
UNSCR 2375: What Just Happened Here? | 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
On Monday evening, the United Nations Security Council quickly and unanimously passed another sanctions resolution against North Korea in a rapid response to its sixth—and strongest—nuclear weapons test just days earlier. In the context of past international sanctions and diplomatic actions in dealing with the North Korean nuclear and missile programs one could have applauded the rapid and unanimous action that will increase the economic price North Korea pays for its actions.
Part II: Tough Is Not Enough | 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
In Part I of this series, I argued that advocates for “getting tough on North Korea” were prone to adopt inappropriate models for a harsher sanctions regime and to ignore the risk of counterproductive North Korean reactions to such sanctions. This is not an argument for no more sanctions. Given North Korean progress on its ICBM and nuclear weapons capabilities, we remain in an ongoing cycle of actions and reactions that may lead to a major war.
Will America Unveil a More Aggressive North Korea Policy?
After a turbulent couple of weeks filled with rhetorical excess, it is clear that US policy towards North Korea’s nuclear weapons and increasingly capable ballistic missile delivery force has shifted only marginally from that of the Obama administration. But a major shift may come soon. The Obama policy focused primarily on sanctions with periodic offers of negotiations preconditioned on Pyongyang’s acceptance of denuclearisation.
Getting Tough on North Korea: Iran and Other Mirages | 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
As North Korea moves closer to its goal of being able to target key parts of the United States with nuclear weapons, it has produced a near universal consensus in Washington that it is “time to get tough” with Pyongyang. By and large this consensus still centers on the same policy tools it has for the past dozen years: economic sanctions capable of coercing Pyongyang into capitulating to US and UN demands that it end its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
Door to Negotiations, or No? | 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
The reports came fast and furious from Manila the other day. Hello, sweetheart, give me rewrite! North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho says the North will never negotiate on nuclear or missiles! North Nixes Tillerson Talk Offer! The stories were breathless, and they were wrong. Anyone familiar with the North’s statements knows that over the past month there has been a major shift in Pyongyang’s formulation about negotiating.
UNSCR 2371: An Invitation to Evasion | RealClearDefense
There are a few good things to say about the UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 2371, which increases sanctions on North Korea. The most important one is that the U.S. put in the time and effort to grind out a sanctions resolution that was passed unanimously.
UNSCR 2371: An Invitation to Evasion | 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
There are a few good things to say about the UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 2371, which increases sanctions on North Korea. The most important one is that the US put in the time and effort to grind out a sanctions resolution that was passed unanimously.
Possible Evidence of the Failed March 22 Missile Test | 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
Reports originating from South Korean and US sources indicate that at 7:00 AM (local time) on March 22, North Korea failed in an attempt to launch a ballistic missile.
Nukes They Can Use? The Danger of North Korea Going Tactical
On March 2, 2016, Kim Jong Un gave direction to the military to “get the nuclear warheads deployed for national defense always on standby so as to be fired at any moment.” The North reiterated versions of this formulation for days afterwards, including a “preemptive nuclear strike of justice.” These threats drew international attention because of concerns about the prospect of imminent violence, particularly in the wake of unprecedented UN sanctions and the kickoff of Key Resolve, the...
“Chat-to-China” Choo Choo: Kim Rides the Rails Again
So let’s review the ones we know for a fact. Some of us are old enough to remember the first time, way back in June of 1983. In the cyclical pattern now repeating in Pyongyang, then it was the youngish Kim Jong Il (42 or maybe 43, so not quite so callow a youth as Kim Jong Un now) who was the dauphin in waiting.
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